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SECURITIES ASPECTS OF PENSION, PROFIT-SHARING,
AND STOCK BONUS PLANS
James R. Craig
I. INTRODUCTION
At the end of the third quarter of 1962, American industry was
maintaining almost 80,000 pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus
plans which met the standards of the United States Treasury Depart-
ment and thus qualified for favorable income tax treatment.' Further-
more, the annual net increase in the number of qualified plans is
currently in excess of 9,000, as compared with a rate of about 1,000
a decade earlier.' Although these figures undoubtedly represent the
bulk of all existing pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans,
there are still others in operation that have not been qualified for
special tax treatment. These statistics indicate that such specialized
compensation plans have become or are fast becoming a very im-
portant part of doing business in this country.
The growth of pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans can
be attributed primarily to their tax advantages and to union pressures.
Demands by unions have been especially significant since it was held
in the Inland Steel case3 in 1948 that such plans were a proper subject
of collective bargaining.
This comment will discuss the securities problems surrounding the
adoption and use of pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans
growing out of the federal securities acts and relevant state legisla-
tion.4
II. DEFINITIONS
Pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans are all arrange-
ments by which employees may be given benefits in excess of regular
salary or wage compensation.' A pension plan systematically provides
for the payment of benefits to retiring employees. A profit-sharing
plan is established and maintained by an employer to provide for
the participation in his profits by employees or their beneficiaries.
'See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 401, 501(a).
'P-H Pen. & Profit Sharing Rep. 5 1511 (1961).
'Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
960 (1949).
4 Not to be presented here are securities problems peculiar to the use of the stock
option, another method widely employed for the giving of employee benefits.
'See P-H Pen. & Profit Sharing Rep. 55 2091 (1955), 3014 (1962), 5043 (1962).
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Payments under a profit-sharing plan normally depend upon the
prosperity of the business as a whole as well as upon individual or
group performance. Stock bonus plans are established by corporate
employers to provide benefits similar to those of profit-sharing plans,
except that benefits are distributable in stock of the company and are
often less dependent upon profits. From the standpoint of securities
regulation, the plans may be dealt with similarly; the discussions fol-
lowing are generally applicable to each.
There are certain characteristics of each of the three plans that are
important in determining whether a particular plan meets the re-
quirements of the securities laws. In voluntary plans, the employee is
not compelled to participate; in compulsory plans, the employee's
participation is a condition of employment. Both of the above types
of plans may be either contributory or noncontributory. A con-
tributory plan, commonly called a "thrift plan" because of the
employee savings feature, is one to which the employee makes con-
tributions in addition to the employer's. Noncontributory plans are
those to which the employee makes no contribution. Also, plans may
be differentiated by the way in which the funds are used. For example,
some plans invest all funds in government bonds, others purchase
insurance and endowment policies, and still others invest in the stock
of the corporate employer. Every plan qualified for favorable tax
treatment is administered by a trustee, often a bank or trust company
or a corporate trustee especially incorporated for that purpose.
Furthermore, provisions may be made for either cash or non-cash
distributions to beneficiaries. Finally, any of the three basic plans
may be combined with either or both of the other two to meet the
needs of a particular employer.
III. REGISTRATION AND OTHER PROBLEMS UNDER
FEDERAL SECURITIES ACTS
A. Securities Exchange Act Of 1934.
Registration under the Securities Exchange Act of 19347 is pres-
ently required for only those securities listed and registered with one
of the national securities exchanges.! Therefore, the registration pro-
visions of the 1934 statute have little or no applicability to pension,
profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans. Interests of beneficiaries in
such plans are held by employees or their assigns and are not traded
on national securities exchanges. The only securities related to em-
' See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 401.
748 Stat. 881-909 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1958).
aSee 48 Stat. 881 (1934), I U.S.C. § 78f (1958).
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ployee benefit plans that are likely to be listed with a national securi-
ties exchange, thus requiring registration by the employer under this
statute, are shares of the corporate employer's stock offered to the
beneficiary under a stock bonus or other plan.9 Such stocks will have
been registered by the company under the provisions of the 1934
statute as a condition of being listed on an exchange, and their regis-
tration will normally not be related to the adoption of a given stock
bonus plan.
B. Securities Act Of 1933.
As pointed out by the United States Supreme Court in SEC v.
Ralston Purina Co.,0 the Securities Act of 193311 is designed "to
protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought
necessary to informed investment decisions."' 2 Whether the framers
of the statute intended it to apply to the compensation arrangements
with which we are concerned has been questioned by some writers."
Neither the Securities Act nor the regulations promulgated there-
under contain provisions expressly related to pension or profit-sharing
plans. 4 Furthermore, the authority of the Securities Exchange Com-
mission over such plans has never been delineated by the judiciary."5
The Commission, however, has taken the position that the provisions
of the 1933 statute do apply to certain types of pensions, profit-
sharing, and stock bonus plans.
1. Registration Requirements.
The registration requirements applicable to a pension, profit-
sharing, or stock bonus plan should be considered from the stand-
point of the assets in which the plan's funds are invested as well as
from the standpoint of the plan itself. In this respect, it is clear that
any plan under which the employee's funds may be invested in
securities of the corporate employer involves a security and is sub-
ject to registration unless the plan is within some exception or exemp-
tion of the 1933 Act. " There are exemptions in favor of government
bonds,"' insurance and endowment policies, and annuity contracts. "
Therefore, most plans are set up to purchase these bonds, policies,
' II Washington & Rothschild, Compensating the Corporate Executive 823-25 (1962).
'0346 U.S. 119 (1953).
1148 Stat. 74-91 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1958).
"SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953).
"3See, e.g., Note, 96 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549 (1948).
'I Loss, Securities Regulation 506, 508 (2d ed. 1961); P-H Pen. & Profit Sharing
Rep. 5 6225 (1959).
5 P-H, op. ci. supra note 14, at 5 6225 (1959).
3 See II Washington & Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 9, at 798.
1748 Stat. 906 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. S 77c(a)(2) (1958).
1848 Stat. 906 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 77c(a) (8) (1958).
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and annuities and do not invest the employees' funds in corporate
securities. However, if the employees' funds are invested in mutual
funds or other corporate securities, the plan will involve a security
and may be subject to registration. If a plan provides that contri-
buted funds must be invested in exempted bonds, policies, or annui-
ties, a security requiring registration will not be involved, and the
plan need not be registered. 9 However, it should be noted that
variable annuities are securities which must be registered under the
Securities Act." Furthermore, a plan confined to endowment policies
or annuity contracts but authorizing the purchase of variable annui-
ties will not be exempted by the statute's annuity exemption. In
addition, certain contributory plans that confer discretion on the
administrator as to the investment of the funds are not exempted
even though the funds are actually invested in exempt securities.2 '
a. Is There a "Security"?- In looking to the characteristics of
the plan itself, as distinguished from the underlying investments,
to determine whether provisions of the 1933 Act are involved, the
first question is whether a security is involved. If there is no security
as defined by section 2 (1)," registration of the plan is -not required.
Section 2 (1) defines "security" as, inter alia, a "certificate of interest
or participation in any profit-sharing agreement" or an "investment
contract." If a plan is to be considered as involving the issuance of a
"security" distinct from the underlying investment securities, it
must be because an interest in the plan is an investment contract or
a participation in a profit-sharing agreement.' As already pointed
out, the Securities Act does not specifically mention employee pen-
sion or profit-sharing plans. The legislative history of the act con-
tains only one isolated reference to such plans, that reference being
made in connection with a proposed amendment to the act. In 1934
the Senate proposed an amendment "to exempt an offering made
solely to employees of an issuer or its affiliates in connection with a
bona fide plan for the payment of extra compensation or stock-
19 II Washington & Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 9, at 798, 800. Prof. Loss comments:
[I]f all employees' contributions under a plan were required to go automati-
cally into governmental securities . . . the employer acting in substance as
their agent without discretion to invest otherwise, there would still seem to
be a separate, non-exempted investment contract in principle. But as a matter
of administrative policy no objection is likely to* be raised. 1 Loss, op. cit.
supra note 15, at 508 n.148.
See Hearings, infra note 24, at 877. But see II Washington & Rothschild, op. cit. supra
note 9, at 799.
2 SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
21 II Washington & Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 9, at 798. See note 27 infra and ac-
companying text.
2 4 8 Stat. 905 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(i) (1958).
23 See I Loss, op. cit. supra note 14, at 506,
1963 ]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
investment plan for the exclusive benefit of such employees."" That
amendment was eliminated in conference "on the ground that the
participants in employees' stock-investment plans may be in as great
need of the protection afforded by availability of information con-
cerning the issuer for which they work as are most other members of
the public."'" Thus, it would appear that the senators and representa-
tives thought the enacted definition of security was broad enough to
cover at least some employee compensation plans. Moreover, the
section 2 definition of "security" has been construed liberally by
the judiciary to bring within the confines of the act many contracts
which are not considered securities by the layman."
The position of the Securities Exchange Commission has been that
any plan providing for the contribution of funds by employees with
the expectation of receiving a return involves a security under the
section 2 (1) definition. The issuer is considered to be either the
employer or the trust entity, if the funds are placed in trust. Whether
the employer makes a contribution under the plan is not controlling.
Theoretically, plans of this type are "investment companies" in which
participation is limited to employees.' Under this reasoning, those
plans providing merely for sick benefits, hospitalization, funeral
expenses, or social and cultural activities do not involve securities
and are not subject to regulation by the act because they do not
provide an expectation of financial return. Furthermore, no separate
"security" is considered to be involved in "insured plans"; the em-
ployer or administrator simply pays the employees' contributions,
usually in the form of salary deductions, to an insurance company
or an exempted annuity company for individual or group policies of
which the employees are beneficiaries. If a particular plan is consider-
ed to involve a security, then one must look further to determine
whether the 1933 Act applies.
b. Is There an "Offering"? - The next consideration is whether
there is an "offering." This term is one of art relating to the defini-
tions contained in section 2(3)" of the 1933 Act. If a plan does not
meet those definitions, even though it may involve a security, it will
" Hearings on H.R. 4344, Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 895 (1941).
"H.R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1934).
"6E.g., devices which purport to be sales or leases of property have been held to be
"securities" within the meaning of the statute because of their "investment contract"
characteristics. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (units of a citrus grove
development); SEC v. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943) (oil and gas lease-
holds); Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953) (units of a citrus develop-
ment).
7 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 14, at 506-8.
848 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. S 77b(3) (1958).
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not be regulated by the act. Under section 2 (3) " 'sale', 'sell', 'offer
to sell' or 'offer for sale' shall include every contract of sale or dis-
position of, attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer
to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value. . .. ""
It is safe to say that a noncontributory pension, profit-sharing, or
stock bonus plan does not require registration."' The Commission
theorizes that there has been no "sale" for "value" because of the
policy determination that there is no "value" given if participation
in a plan is merely an incident of employment and involves no de-
ductions from the employees' pay."' However, the benefits that the
employee receives under a noncontributory plan cannot properly
be considered as having been granted without consideration simply
because no financial contribution was made by such employee." An
interesting question is whether the Commission would continue to
take the same position if faced with a plan in which the promised
future benefits were so great that the employee could be considered
to have rendered his services primarily to obtain those benefits rather
than for his normal compensation. Furthermore, the Commission's
reasoning might not apply to a noncontributory plan under which,
e.g., the employee could elect to take his benefits in either cash or his
employer's stock or other securities.
Contributory plans, on the other hand, may be designed for either
voluntary or involuntary employee contributions. The involuntary
plan normally requires contributions through automatic payroll
deductions. This plan, like the noncontributory plan, has been con-
sidered by the Securities Exchange Commission as not involving a
"sale.""3 Chairman Purcell of the Commission explained that:
Compulsory plans do not require registration. If a plan is so set up
that participation in it is a condition of employment, the Commission
21 Ibid.
30 Hearings, supra note 24, at 896; 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 14, at 507; P-H Pen. &
Profit Sharing Rep. 5 6226 (1959).
311 Loss, op. cit. supra note 14, at 508. See Op. SEC Ass't Gen. Counsel, 1941, 1
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 5 2231.21 (1959):
[It is because of the language of Section 2(3) that we have taken the posi-
tion in the past that no 'offer' or 'sale' is involved in the case of a non-
contributory plan, where the employees are not requested to make any contri-
butions, or in the case of a compulsory plan, where there is no element of
volition on the part of employees whether or not to participate and make
contributions. Id. at 1172-73.
" In actions brought by employees to enforce the provisions of noncontributory com-
pensation plans, most courts find adequate consideration in the fact of continued employ-
ment and do not require a showing that the employee would have remained at his job
in the absence of the plan. See Note, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 490, 494 (1957).
3 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 14, at 507; II Washington & Rothschild, op. cit. supra
note 9, at 806; P-H Pen. & Profit Sharing Rep. 5 6226 (1959). See Op. SEC Ass't Gen.
Counsel, supra note 31.
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has taken the position that, as in the case of a noncontributory or
bonus plan, there is no sale involved. The purpose of the registration
provisions of the Securities Act is to disclose to prospective investors
the essential facts about securities which they are asked to buy, and
if the employees are given no choice as to whether to buy or to refuse
to buy there hardly seems any point in the registration process.'
The major securities problems concern plans that are both volun-
tary and contributory. The Commission has taken the position that
such plans are technically offers to sell securities and are, in the ab-
sence of exemptions, subject to registration. 5 However, there has
-never been a formal ruling by the Commission or the courts on the
status of any of these plans under the Securities Act." Furthermore,
a proposal by the Commission in 1941 that the Securities Act be
amended to exempt certain plans was opposed by employers' repre-
sentatives who were not willing to concede that any of the plans were
covered by the enacted statute."'
Significantly, although the Commission has indicated that all
voluntary contributory plans are subject to registration, it has not
put its determination into practical effect by requiring broad scale
registration. For a number of years, registration was waived on the
grounds that suitable forms were not available."s Then, in 1953 the
Commission adopted a special registration form, S-8. That form
required registration only for contributory plans under which in-
vestment was authorized in securities of the employer,"' and then
only if the purchase of the employer's securities might be in excess
of the employer's contributions under the plan.4' Form S-8, after
revision in 1962, may be used only by those issuers required to file
current reports with the Commissioner by virtue of their having
issued securities listed on a national securities exchange or because
the aggregate value of their outstanding securities equals or exceeds
2,000,000 dollars.' With the exception of the plans covered by this
registration form, the Securities Commission still takes the informal
34 Hearings, supra note 24, at 896-97.
3 P-H Pen. & Profit Sharing Rep. 5 6226 (1959); Op. SEC Ass't Gen. Counsel, 1941,
I CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 5 2231.21 (1959). See Commissioner Purcell's definition of an
investment contract as any plan under which employees are given the opportunity to place
their earnings in a fund to be invested for their benefit and later returned to them.
Hearings, supra note 24, at 899.
10 Loss, op. cit. supra note 14, at 508.
a See II Washington & Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 9, at 807 n.48.
38See Note, 96 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 550 (1948).
3 SEC Securities Act Release No. 3480, _, 1953. There it was made clear that
form S-8 did not apply to "an offering of interests in a plan which does not involve an
offering of securities of an employer." Id. at 1.
40 If Washington & Rothschild, op. cit supra note 9, at 807.
41 See 17 C.F.R. § 239.16b (Supp. 1963). See also 48 Stat. 894-95 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m, 78o(d) (1958) for d¢kirsation of those issuers required to file annual reports.
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position that "no question will be raised with respect to the registra-
tion of participations in a voluntary contributory pension, profit-
sharing, or similar plan that does not invest in the securities of the
employer company in an amount exceeding the company's contribu-
tions." 2 Still, it has been wisely said that "the law in this respect is
not sufficiently clear ... for safety's sake the SEC's opinion should
be sought regarding the need for registering a particular plan.""
c. The Private Offering Exemption. - If a given plan is found
to involve a security offered for sale, it is still possible that it
is exempt from registration, if it is one of those plans to which
the S-8 registration form applies. The Securities Act specifically
exempts "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offer-
ing."" Although it might appear that an offering of securities to
employees would not be an offering to the "public," in the normal
sense of that word, such a conclusion is unsound in the context of
the 1933 Act. The term "public" as it is used in the act has been given
a very broad meaning, and it is unlikely that many plans will be
able to satisfy the requirements of this exemption. An example of
this expansive interpretation may be found in SEC v. Ralston Purina
Co.45 In that case, the Securities Exchange Commission brought an
action to enjoin the offering and sale of unregistered company stock
by Ralston Purina Co. to certain "key employees." The company
relied upon the section 4(1) "private offering exemption." The
Court, in reversing a dismissal of the Commission's suit, held that
"to be public an offer need not be open to the whole world."4 It
indicated that the proper way to interpret the act's "private offering
exemption" was to view it in the light of the statute's purpose "to
protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought
necessary to informed investment decisions." 7 The Court stated that
only "an offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for
themselves is a transaction 'not involving any public offering'.""
Moreover, the court indicated that corporate employees, as a class,
42 Letter From G. J. O'Leary, Assistant Director, Division of Corporation Finance, SEC,
to Prentice Hall, 1953, P-H Pen. & Profit Sharing Rep. 11941 (1962); Letter From
Chas. E. Shreve, Chief Counsel, Division of Corporation Finance, SEC, to Prentice Hall,
1962: "The position stated in the letter of . . . 1953 is still pursued by this Division."
P-H Pen. & Profit Sharing Rep. 5 11941 (1962). See also 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 14,
at 511; P-H Pen. & Profit Sharing Rep. 5 6228 (1957).4
aP-H Pen. & Profit Sharing Rep. 5 6225 (1959).
4448 Stat. 906 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1958).
4 346 U.S. 119 (1953). The Court's interpretation must suffice because the term






should not be deprived of the safeguards of the act and that "em-
ployees are just as much members of the investing 'public' as any of
their neighbors in the community"4" absent a showing of special
circumstances which would give them access to the kind of informa-
tion available through registration under the act.
Thus, theoretically, a public offering exemption is not determined
by the number of offerees, but rather by the degree of their knowl-
edge of the business affairs of the company. However, the Commis-
sion has long used its "rule of twenty-five" in such cases." Mr.
Andrew Orrick, then a member of the Commission, explained in
1957 that "as a rule of thumb, the Commission has considered that
an offering made to not more than 25 or 30 persons . . . is generally
a private transaction not requiring registration."'" This "rule of
thumb" is clearly not binding under the act, and the Supreme Court
made clear that there is "no warrant for superimposing a quantity
limit on private offerings as a matter of statutory interpretation.""
The Court conceded, however, that nothing prevented the Commis-
sion, "in enforcing the statute, from using some kind of numerical
test in deciding when to investigate particular exemption claims.""
As a practical matter, therefore, it is fairly safe to rely on this "rule
of twenty-five." However, with an offering to more than twenty-five
employees, the Commission will not give a "no action" letter "unless
there is a showing that the offering is limited to executive or manage-
ment personnel who are acquainted with and have access to the busi-
ness and financial information concerning the issuer.",
4
Most plans do not qualify for the private offering exemption for
two reasons. The first is that more than twenty-five persons are
normally covered in a given plan, and the second is that most plans
include employees who do not qualify as sufficiently informed. Sig-
nificantly, to obtain favorable tax treatment under the Internal
49 d. at 126.
"See Op. SEC Gen. Counsel, 1935, 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 5 2266.17 (1962).
" Orrick, Some Observations on the Administration of the Securities Laws, 42 Minn.
L. Rev. 25, 33 (1957).
" SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
5 Ibid.
5 Orrick, supra note 51, at 33. For these reasons, interests in a pension, profit-sharing,
or stock bonus plan otherwise covered may be exempted from registration as part of a
,private offering only where the number of participants in the plan is less than twenty-five,
as a practical matter, or where the participants, if more than twenty-five, are all key
employees "all of whom are fully familiar with the business affairs of the company."
II Washington & Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 9, at 814. Only in very rare cases has
the Commission ruled an offering to employees to be exempt when more than one hundred
were eligible to participate. Ibid. It should be clear that only those fairly high on the execu-
tive ladder can qualify as being sufficiently informed as not to need the protective benefits of
the act. See generally Israels, Some Commercial Overtones of Private Placement, 45 Va. L.
Rev. 851, 852-53 (1959).
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Revenue Code of 1954, plans must provide benefits to employees
below the executive level and cannot discriminate in favor of super-
visory employees.5'
Another problem is that under a plan providing for the distribu-
tion of stock of the corporate employer, registration of the stock is
required even if there is only one beneficiary so long as he purchases
with the intent to resell to the public. This conclusion is based upon
the provision of the act requiring registration of securities publicly
offered by underwriters as well as by issuers,"6 and an underwriter,
as defined by section 2 (11), includes "any person who has purchased
from an issuer with a view to ... the distribution of any security."'"
Such definition is broad enough to make the single beneficiary a
statutory underwriter if he purchases with an intent to resell to the
public." This problem will arise more often with a stock option plan
than with pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans because a
stock option plan most often distributes corporate stocks to em-
ployees. The problems of the statutory underwriter and secondary
distribution will be considered in more detail."
d. The "Intrastate" Exemption. - Another exemption found in
the Securities Act is that for purely intrastate transactions. Section
3 (11) exempts from the provisions of the act "any security which
is a part of an issue sold only to persons resident within a single
State or Territory, where the issuer of such security is a ... corpora-
tion, incorporated by and doing business within, such State or
Territory." This exemption is applicable to interests in pension,
profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans" and can be very useful to the
relatively small company with no out-of-state employees. However,
care should be taken to ascertain that no interests in the given plan
are to go to out-of-state residents, for one such "sale" would destroy
the exemption for the entire plan." The intrastate exemption is not
generally helpful to the larger companies in which pension, profit-
sharing, and stock bonus plans are now most commonly found, for
those companies tend to interstate operations and are likely to have
employees in more than one state. Furthermore, if the plan is ad-
ministered by a trust so that the trust is the issuer of the participa-
55See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 401 (a).
'"See 48 Stat. 906 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1958).
5748 Stat. 905 (1934), 15 U.S.C. S 77b(11) (1958).
5 See Israels, supra note 54, at 852.
"9 See text accompanying note 77 infra.
0048 Stat. 906 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(11) (1958).
" See II Washington & Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 9, at 817-18; Op. SEC Ass't Gen.
Counsel, 1941, 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 2231.21 (1959).
" See generally 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 14, at 591-605.
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tions in the plan and the trust entity is incorporated in a state other
than the one in which the company does business, the intrastate ex-
emption will not apply even for the small intrastate company.
e. The nSmall Issue" Exemption. - There are no other exemptions
under the Securities Act that are of any practical use in connection
with new pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans," with the
exception of the exemption from normal registration requirements
provided by Regulation A of the Securities Exchange Commission for
offerings of securities aggregating less than 300,000 dollars annually.
This exemption differs from those above in that it does not exempt
the security from coverage by the act, but merely provides a simpler
registration process for small issues which would otherwise be re-
quired to be registered through normal channels, viz., form S-8."
The Regulation A exemption, often called the "small issue exemp-
tion," is not automatic, but exists only after certain prescribed
conditions are met. The essential conditions are: (1) that notification
of the issue be filed in the office of the Commission for the region in
which the corporation's principal business operations are conducted
at least ten days before the offering begins and (2) that for offerings
aggregating over 50,000 dollars, an offering circular giving basic
information about the issuer and the securities be filed and used in
contacts with offerees.es The exemption is available if aggregate offer-
ing prices of the securities during a one year period do not exceed
300,000 dollars. The Commission's current view is that Regulation A
is applicable to the "securities" of a voluntary contributory pension,
profit-sharing, or similar plan "if the employees' contributions to the
plan are not more than 300,000 dollars for any one year period.""
63 However, theoretically there are additional grounds for exemption that may be avail-
able in a particular case.
For example, the plan may not involve any offering in interstate commerce or
require the use of the mails. However, such a possibility is rare and this will
usually be a risky exemption on which to rely. To bring the transaction within
the Act it is not necessary that a prospectus or security be mailed; any use
of the mails or of interstate communication is sufficient. II Washington &
Rotchschild, op. cit. supra note 9, at 817.
Furthermore, it has been pointed out that an exemption exists under "Section 3(a) (1) in
the case of plans which have been continuously in existence since some date prior to July
27, 1933, and under which there has been no substantial change since that date in the
nature of the security or of the terms of the offering." Op. SEC Ass't Gen. Counsel, 1941,
1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 5 2231.21 (1959). The Commission has also adopted three
exemptions from registration in addition to Regulation A. Regulation F exempts certain
issues of assessable mining stock of less than $100,000; Regulation B exempts various kinds
of fractional undivided interests in oil or gas rights up to $100,000 in total amount, and
Regulation B-T exempts certain certificates of interest in trusts or unincorporated associa-
tions whose assets consist substantially of fractional oil or gas leasehold interests.
" See generally 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 14, at 605-634.
65 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.262 (Supp. 1963).
6 P-H Pen. & Profit Sharing Rep. 5 6228 (1963). See 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 14,
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Note that the 300,000 dollar limitation is not applied to the amounts
contributed by the employer. This view, of course, follows from the
Commission's determination that a "sale" is involved only where the
employee makes voluntary contributions under a given plan. "7 Under
Regulation A, the corporation or trust administering the plan, con-
sidered to be the issuer of the interests therein, would be required to
file anew each year for the contributions to be made in that year.
f. Registration Form S-8. - If a given pension, profit-sharing, or
stock bonus plan is of the voluntary contributory type with em-
ployees' contributions allowed to be invested in securities of the cor-
porate employer, and there are no applicable exemptions from the
coverage of the act, and, further, if the employee contributions
thereto will exceed 300,000 dollars annually so that Regulation A
is inapplicable, the registration on form S-8 is required."8 This form
was adopted as of June 6, 1953.6' At that time, the Commission ex-
plained that "most employees' stock purchase plans provide an
opportunity for the accumulation by employees of securities of the
employer upon favorable terms."70 Therefore, "the investment de-
cision required to be made by the employee is of a substantially differ-
ent character than is involved where securities offered for the pur-
pose of raising capital are sold upon the best obtainable terms."'"
Because of this difference, the form "is not intended for the registra-
tion of securities offered primarily for the purpose of raising
capital." '
at 615; Letter From G. J. O'Leary, Assistant Director, Division of Corporation Finance,
SEC, to Prentice Hall, 1953, P-H Pen. & Profit Sharing Rep. 5 11941 (1962). This is a
relaxation of the Commission's earlier view that the $300,000 limitation to the
amount of employee contributions applied to the total amount contributed throughout the
life of the plan. Op. SEC Gen. Counsel, 1945, 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 5 2231.22 (1959).
07 See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
8s See note 39 supra and accompanying text. Interestingly, even before the adoption
of form S-8, and during the time that the Commission informally took the position that
full registration would not be required of the voluntary contributory plans which were
considered to entail offers of securities, a few full registrations were filed. I Loss, op. cit.
supra note 14, at 509. For example, each year statements were filed by Sears Roebuck &
Co. and by the separate trust company administering the Sears pension and profit-sharing
plan. The Sears plan requires that the fund be invested in company stock so far as is
practicable and advisable. At the end of 1958, the plan owned in excess of twenty-six per
cent of Sear's outstanding stock and was the company's single largest stockholder. The
plan at that time had assets in excess of 1,061,000,000 dollars, with seventy-four per cent
of them invested in Sears stock. N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1959, p. 38, col. 2. For those who
used this form of full registration, the Commission adopted a rule permitting the use of
an abreviated prospectus for stock in which the plan's funds were to be invested. I Loss,
op. cit. supra note 14, at 509.
"9SEC Securities Act Release No. 3438, ., 1953. The form and its accom-
panying instructions are set out at P-H Pen. & Profit sharing Rep. 55 8821-22 (1959).





To register a plan by form S-8, one must file an abbreviated pro-
spectus which includes a brief description of the plan, the employer's
securities offered thereunder, and the employer's certified financial
statement. The most recent annual certified reports to stockholders
will suffice, so that there is no need to have financial statements pre-
pared solely for the purpose of registration."3 The employer must
furnish to participating employees copies of all material distributed
to stockholders, and the company must likewise periodically file such
materials with the Commission for information purposes.'4 Possibly
the most notable attribute of the form is that it eliminates the neces-
sity for separate registration of the participations in the plan and the
securities offered thereunder.' Also, it makes the cost of registration
much less than the cost of a full registration."
2. Statutory Underwriter and Secondary Distribution Problems.
Some significant problems arise under the 1933 Act because of the
inter-relationship of sections 2 (11), 4 (1), and 5. Section 2 (11) de-
fines "underwriter" as "any person who has purchased from an issuer
with a view to, or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribu-
tion of any security .... [T]he term 'issuer' shall include, in addi-
tion to an issuer, any person directly or indirectly controlling or
controlled by the issuer, or any person under direct or indirect com-
mon control with the issuer.""' Section 4 (1) exempts from registra-
tion "transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or
dealer; transactions by an issuer not involving any public offer-
ing . ,,""' Section 5 is the act's basic registration requirement."
Because the term "underwriter" is defined in section 2 (11) to in-
clude a person who contracts with either the issuer or any person in
a control relationship with the issuer, a "secondary distribution" of
outstanding securities must be registered if the person for whose
account the distribution is made is in a control relationship with the
issuer of the security. Furthermore, the definition of "control" under
the Securities Act is not limited to ownership of a majority of the
'
3 See 17 C.F.R. § 239.16b (Supp. 1963).
74 Ibid.
"'See II Washington & Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 9, at 808.
"e This savings is particularly good from the standpoint of a trusteed plan, considered
to be the issuer of its participation, for the cost of registration of its participations comes
from the plan's funds, Hearings on H.R. 4344 Before the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 1020 (1942), and that cost is now much
less than it might have been with a requirement of full registration and the necessity to
compile, print, and distribute a major prospectus. Ibid.
7748 Stat. 905 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1958).
"848 Stat, 906 (1934), 15 U.S.C. 5 77d(1) (1958).
"9See 48 Stat. 906 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1958).
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stock of the controlled company."0 If an officer or director is found
to be one with substantial influence on company policies, he is con-
sidered a "controlling person.""1 Likewise, a stockholder with far less
than majority ownership may be considered a controlling person."'
These statutory underwriter and secondary distribution provisions
do not apply to pension, profit-sharing, or stock bonus plans unless
the particular plan invests funds in the corporate employer's securi-
ties or unless it is non-funded and distributes employer's stock direct-
ly to the employees. Without a purchase from the issuer of his stock,
there can be no resale and distribution problems. However, problems
arise if either the plan as an entity or the beneficiaries can be con-
sidered to have purchased the employer's securities.
If the purchaser, either the plan itself or the beneficiary there-
under, obtains the employer's stock with a view to distribution and
then makes a public offer of the stock, such purchaser is within the
definition of statutory underwriter in section 2 (11), and the trans-
action must be registered."3 Registration may be carried out by either
the issuer or the purchaser, but the issuer will be liable for a violation
of the act's registration provisions if it sells unregistered and non-
exempt securities to the purchaser for distribution.
As noted above, the private offering exemption is unavailable if
the buyer intends to redistribute the securities. However, if the pur-
chaser purchases only for investment, the issuer may not be required
to register because of the private offering exemption. Whether a
particular purchase is one for "investment" is often a matter of
intent which must be proven. There are ways to attempt to insure
an investment intent, such as the taking of an investment letter
from the purchaser or placing restrictions on the resale of the stock."'
Often the purchaser may subsequently decide to sell even though he
had a bona fide investment intent when he originally purchased it.
He may then do so without registration if he is not a "controlling
person," and there will be no violation of the act. He does not meet
the statutory definition of underwriter because he did not purchase
originally with a view to distribution.
However, if the purchaser is a "controlling person," when he resells
or deals in his stock he will be conisdered an issuer under section
802 Loss, Securities Regulation 770 (1961).
8
'1d. at 781.
82 Id. at 776. It has been said that whether a secondary distribution by a given stock-
holder requires registration depends upon whether that person has enough influence with
the issuer's management to be able to obtain the issuer's signature on a registration state-
ment. Id. at 780-81.




2 (11), and the transaction must be registered unless otherwise ex-
empted. Moreover, any one purchasing from the controlling person
with a view to distribution is considered an underwriter under section
2 (11) and will also need registration of his transaction if it is not
otherwise exempted. Of course, both these transactions are exempted
if the private offering exemption in the second clause of section 4 (1)
is met.
The "control" problem is particularly acute in the area of these
compensatory arrangements. The purchaser-beneficiary may be an
influential officer in the company. It may be that the plan is an inde-
pendent entity, but that its administrators are the officers of the
company as well. In which case, there is common control and the
section 2 (11) definition has been met. Finally, the plan may obtain
such a percentage of the company's outstanding stock that it actually
becomes a "controlling" stockholder. Consider the case of the Sears
Roebuck & Co. pension plan; the plan owns twenty-six per cent of
the company's stock and is the largest single stockholder.8" There is
little doubt that the Sears plan is a "controlling person" within the
definition of section 2 (11 ).
3. Effects of Violation of the Registration Provisions.
If a transaction or security is not exempt from registration under
the act and registration is not made, the penalties of the act apply. "
Should the plan itself be voided by non-registration? In A. C. Frost
& Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp.," the Supreme Court held en-
forceable a stock option contract which the defendant company
argued was unenforceable because the underlying shares had not been
registered as required by the Securities Act. The Court noted that
"the clear legislative purpose [of the 1933 Act] was protection of
innocent purchasers of securities. They are given definite remedies
inconsistent with the idea that every contract having relation to
sales of unregistered shares is absolutely void.""8 The Commission
has subsequently taken the view that the contract in the Frost case
was not intended to harm the investing public, but that a contract
in violation of the Securities Act calculated to cause such harm should
not be enforceable.8 Of course, since the plaintiff in the Frost case
was attempting to enforce his contract, rescission is still a possibility.
Under section 12 of the Securities Act, an investor who buys from
85 See note 68 supra.
8
'3ee 48 Stat. 82-84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §5 77k, 77L (1958).
87312 U.S. 38 (1941).
81 Id. at 43.
89 II Washington & Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 9, at 822.
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one who violates section 5, by failure to register or otherwise, may
recover the consideration paid on tender of the securities, or he may
recover damages if he no longer owns the security. In Deckert v.
Independence Shares Corp.," the Supreme Court upheld an action
for rescission based on defendant's violation of the Securities Act.
Therefore, although an employee can enforce his rights under a pen-
sion, profit-sharing, or stock bonus plan, he may also recover his
contributions by a rescission action if the plan should have been
registered, but was not. In addition, the regular civil liabilities under
sections 11 and 12, which allow damages or rescission, apparently
would apply against an employee benefit plan just as against any
other issuer if misleading statements or omissions were found in
registration statements and prospectuses.9
IV. REGISTRATION UNDER STATE BLUE SKY LAWS
Pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans must be considered
in the light of the state "blue sky" laws as well as from the stand-
point of the relevant federal regulation. Most states have adopted
laws aimed at the prevention of fraudulent practices in the sale of
securities. Definitions of "security" under most of the state laws are
broad enough so that participations in employee benefit plans may be
subject to regulation." Many of those states, however, exempt quali-
fied plans from their "blue sky" laws by explicit statutory provision."
In some states, the "blue sky" laws have not yet been interpreted with
respect to employee benefit plans;94 in other states, the statutes have
been determined to have no applicability to such plans.95 A few
states consider the "blue sky" laws to be regulative of employee bene-
fit plans and enforce registration requirements.9 Because there is so
little unanimity among the states and the rules in most of the states
are poorly articulated, it would appear wise to contact the state
securities administrator when the question arises whether or not the
state "blue sky" law applies to a given plan.
In Texas, the present securities act defines a security as, among
other things, "a certificate in or under a profit sharing or participa-
tion agreement."97 There is no statutory exemption in Texas for
9°311 U.S. 282 (1940).
91 See testimony of Commissioner Purcell, Hearings on H.R. 4344 Before the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 1021 (1942).





"'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 581-4(A) (Supp. 1962).
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pension, profit-sharing, or stock bonus plans, but under the prior
securities act, which defined "security" as does the present act, 8 the
Attorney General ruled the act inapplicable to the voluntary and
contributory pension trust of Safeway Stores, Inc." Because the Safe-
way plan was held not to involve the issuance of a "security," there
is some indication that the present Texas "blue sky" law will not be
considered applicable to employee benefit plans. However, the
authority is far too slim for reliance, and the State Securities Com-
missioner should be contacted about any proposed plan.
V. CONCLUSION
There are far more securities problems, both federal and state, con-
nected with the use of pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans
than most persons realize. Still, it appears questionable whether em-
ployee benefit plans should be matters for securities regulation, at least
under the federal "disclosure" theory. The concerns of an employee
when faced with the choice of whether to participate in a voluntary
benefit program are very much different from those of the independ-
ent investor in the securities market. The Securities Exchange
Commission has recognized this difference by adopting the simplified
registration procedure of form S-8 for some plans and by not requir-
ing registration for others that it considers covered by the securities
acts. Yet, until it is finally determined whether the securities acts do
properly apply to interests in these plans, great care should be taken
to ascertain the applicability of the securities laws as they are pres-
ently interpreted to the facts of each plan. It is far better to stand
the expense of registration than to run the risk of serious civil liabili-
ties for nonregistration.
9STex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 600a(2) (a) (1953).
9' 165 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. - (1947).
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